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This paper compares individual preferences for a market economy in Western and Eastern Europe over more than one decade, since 
the fall of Berlin Wall. The aim is to understand whether preferences in the two blocks have converged towards the current 
orientation of the EU’s economic policy: a market economy, where the Government decides the rules, but does not enter the game 
directly. This is important as in a democratic system the approved guidelines need the support of the population to be fully effective 
and not reversed by a change of the government. In the EU the integration process is still going on, especially since the entrance of 
several Eastern countries. This paper shows that Eastern and Western Europeans have different preferences: the first would like a 
larger direct intervention of the public hand in the economy, while the second prefer a more private-oriented market than their 
Eastern peers. In addition for the citizens of ex-soviet countries, the concept of “competition” seems to represent more the new 
ideology that defeated the communism rather than a real market mechanism. Nevertheless some convergence emerges from data, 
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1.  Introduction 
On November the 9
th 1989 the Wall of Berlin felt. During twenty-seven years it had been the 
material symbol of the post-war division of Europe into two blocks: communist countries strictly 
controlled by the U.S.S.R. on the East side, liberist countries linked to the U.S.A. on the West side. 
During more than forty years an ideological war had been fought within Europe. After the collapse 
of the Wall, all the communist European governments started to fall, and, a couple of years after, 
the communist regimes were nothing but history. However, the long dominations left a significant 
ideological and above all economic legacy. The former communist countries needed restructuring 
deeply: a large wave of reforms was launched and a new revolution towards the free market began. 
The implemented reforms changed the political, the social and the economic systems of these 
countries. The aim of the reforms was the radical change of the political and economic institutions 
in order to shape them on the Western standards; in the long run the Eastern countries would have 
joined the European Union in order to build a strong and big unique European player. 
 
Before these countries to join the European Union, not only the radical change of their 
institutions was needed, but also some economic convergence towards the Western countries, with a 
tradition of competition and free market, which were accentuating under the supervision of the 
Commission. Moving from a communist state to a capitalistic world is not only a matter of reforms 
imposed by a government and/or a supranational institution. This process requires a strong people’s 
support, especially in countries whose governments are democratically elected. This means that the 
convergence must be not only written on the paper of acts and regulations, but it has to arise from 
the preferences of the population, who must support the reforms over the time. Given the particular 
situation of the former soviet economies, it was not so clear that the population would have 
supported the process over the time, especially at the beginning, when the losses largely exceeded 
the benefits. If it is true that Eastern Europeans wanted the fall of the communist regimes and 
desired to adopt the Western institutions, the price to be paid could have cooled down the initial 
enthusiasm and stopped the process, as the model by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) predicts (see 
also Rodrik, 1995 and Fidrmuc, 1999 and 2000). If we consider elections during the last twenty 
years, the conclusion is that some doubt about the convenience of the transition arose (although this 
could just be an effect of a still large proportion of workers employed in the state sector – see 
Fidrmuc, 1999).  
 
 This paper analyzes the problem of the convergence of people’s preferences for a free market 
in Eastern Europe and compares these preferences with those of the population of Western   3
countries
1. In particular the paper aims at: 1) establishing whether the two blocks differ with respect 
to these preferences, 2) at analyzing whether there is a trend of these preferences over the time, 3) at 
investigating if the trend (if any) shows a convergence between preferences in the two blocks and 4) 
at capturing (if any) the signs of a legacy of the communism in individual preferences through the 
analysis of the main personal characteristics which correlate with the preference for (or against) a 
capitalistic market. 
 
The importance of this research is due to the link between people’s preferences and 
implemented policies highlighted by Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina et al. (2004). In the case of 
democratic countries (i.e. those countries in which free political elections are regularly held), when 
the majority of the electors does not support the reforms implemented by the government, they are 
likely to vote for a party (or a coalition of parties) which slows down, stops, or even reverses the 
process. Kim and Pirttilä (2006) find further empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Knowing the preferences of the electors helps to predict the future path of the policies
2. This 
implies that if the preferences are divergent in the two blocks, then we could expect the process of 
integration to be hindered. For this reason the analysis of the individual characteristics (age, 
education, gender, and political orientation) is important in order to detect possible signs of the past. 
Moreover no study comparing directly preferences in Western and Eastern Europe exists. This 
means that this paper constitutes an interesting ground on which further comparisons could be built. 
 
Immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes, several authors studied the issue of 
people’s support to competition in Eastern Europe. However the most of the extant research focuses 
only on one country at a time and no study compares the situation in the former communist 
countries with that of Western Europe. We do not know whether Eastern and Western Europeans 
support the institutions of a capitalistic and private market to a different extent. It is possible that 
scholars have not yet attempted this comparison, as they have deemed the time elapsed since the fall 
of the Wall to be too short. Yet some of the former communist countries have already entered the 
European Union (EU), and some others will be admitted soon. As the EU strongly supports an 
                                                 
1 The division between Eastern and Western Europe is based on the fact that the country belonged to the soviet or to the capitalistic 
block. As a consequence Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and West Germany. Eastern Europe 
includes: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Croatia, Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR 
of Macedonia,  Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
2 However Stokes (1996) shows that economic deterioration can increase political support for the government, as the electors think 
that the Government’s policies are antidotal. This means that during an economic crisis the Government can be sufficiently 
convincing about the effectiveness of its reforms in the future.  It must be notes that this finding is relative to the limited case of 
Poland and just five years after the collapse of the communist regime, when the population still perceived the economic struggle and 
the reforms as necessary to the transition. Analysing a sample of 19 Latin-American countries, Lora (1998) finds empirical support 
for this possibility. Also the results of Kim and Prittilä (2006) – relative to a sample of Eastern European countries – are in 
accordance with Lora’s.   4
economy based on competition and private property, a comparison between the support to it in the 
two blocks appears to be useful. In particular it can provide insights to better understand the future 
of the Union and to evaluate the probability that some popular opposition could slow down the 
integration. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991), for example, propose a theoretical model suggesting that 
a reform which initially obtains the support of the population can become unpopular and generate 
opposition, although in another theoretical model Blanchard (1997) suggests that the support to 
economic reforms can evolve over a U-shaped time path, which is what this paper basically finds. 
Moreover Hibbs (1977), Alesina et al. (2001) d Alesina et al. (2004) show that people’s preferences 
and implemented economic policies go hand in hand. Although the direction of the causality is 
unknown, if in a democratic country the majority of the population dislikes the actual economic 
institutions, they can elect a government which promises (and perhaps fulfils the promise) to restore 
the past conditions. 
  
The results of this paper show that there is still some difference in preferences between 
Eastern and Western Europeans. In particular the first prefer the government to intervene in the 
economy more than Western do. Compared to the Western block, the citizens of the formerly 
communist countries have a stronger preference for public ownership of firms and for a wider 
system of welfare state. I have to highlight, however, that the WVS captures a general preference for 
private ownership. Moreover my results are supportive of Blanchard (1997): the evolution of 
individual preferences over the time shows an initial strong support for private property and 
competition that has noticeably decreased during the fist years of transition, and then has recovered.    5
2.  Reasons to support (or to oppose to) a market economy 
There are several reasons to expect Eastern Europeans to oppose to a competitive and private 
market, but there are also a number of motivations that could support the reforms undertaken during 
the transition. First there could be an “indoctrination effect”: forty years of communist regime can 
have left a legacy in people’s minds (on the existence of a “communist legacy” see, among others, 
Blanchflower and Freeman, 1997). The consequence could be that Eastern Europeans support the 
free market less than Western Europeans. I must also highlight that this hypothesis is contrary to 
Shiller et al. (1991) – who find very weak indoctrination effects, if any, in the Soviet Union –  and 
to Firebaugh and Sandu (1998) – who find that ideology did not make Romanians to prefer 
collectivism rather than free market. However the legacy, instead of being directly determined by 
the ideology, could also be indirect. Sartori (1991) emphasizes that the Communism has engendered 
the “sheltered man”: the experience of the regime would have induced the individual to develop a 
strong risk aversion and since the transition increased riskiness of the job market, then Sartori’s 
sheltered man could oppose to the free market. However, after suffering deprivation under the past 
regimes, the population could have initially over supported the institutions of a market based on 
private property as a reaction to the past. 
 
Secondly and strictly related to indoctrination, education could exert a negative influence on 
supporting a private market in Eastern Europe: education has been one of the main channels to 
spread the communist doctrine among people. As a consequence the longer the exposure to the 
official communist theories the stronger could be the opposition to a reformed market. However 
better educated people can access more information than the others (that means that they could 
know and perceive the shortcomings of the regime better than the others); moreover human capital 
constitutes a sort of insurance against the unemployment produced by reforms
3, and in this sense 
reduces uncertainty and risk. In addition several studies on Eastern European countries (for example 
Vecernik, 1995; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995; Rutkowski, 1996 and Brainerd, 1998) show that 
returns on education are higher in a market economy than in a central planned economy, therefore 
more educated people would tend to be in favour of reforms more than others. Among others, Duch 
(1993), Gabel and Palmer (1995), Gabel (1998a and 1998b), Eble and Koeva (2002) and Hayo 
(2004) find support for this conclusion in a sample of formerly communist European countries, and 
this paper joins their club. In Western Europe education could have a positive effect on supporting 
competition, as more educated people are more aware of the benefits of the free market than those 
people with less education are.  
 
                                                 
3 Notice that a large part of this unemployment was of long-term (see Fidrmuc, 1999).   6
Thirdly, natural risk aversion can generate opposition to a market economy. The more risk 
adverse people are the less likely they are to support reforms (Firebaugh and Sandu, 1998). 
Moreover as people do not know ex ante either if they will benefit or lose from the reforms nor who 
will gain from them, the (majority of the) population could be against reforming the economic 
system
4. Furthermore Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) show that women generally prefer even 
rather than unequal distributions Consistently with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Gabriel 
(1992), Firebaugh and Sandu (1998), Hayo (1999a and 1999b), Camerer (2003) and Kaltenthaler et 
al. (2006) find that women are less prone to support a system based on free market and competition 
(whose outcome is in general more risk and more income inequality with respect to an ideal 
socialist system); therefore I expect female interviewees to be less prone to bear an increase of 
riskiness than males are and I introduce gender as a control. However, while the gender attitude 
might be independent of the past regimes (i.e. women support a market economy less than male, 
simply because they dislike inequality and risk as female), risk aversion should be on average more 
pronounced among people formerly living under a communist regime, than in the other countries 
(and this should hold for both genders). The reason is that Eastern Europeans had to abandon a 
system ensuring
5 food and job to everybody for a new environment in which they are no longer 
provided with food and jobs by the government and the risk of losing the job (once got) is real and 
probable. Instead, Western Europeans are used to this situation since their birth.  
 
Fourthly people are not only risk averse, but they also tend to be inequality averse (see for 
example Rawls, 1971, Barr, 1998 and Schwarze and Härpfer, 2007). For this reason people in both 
blocks could prefer market institutions which are more social than those proposed by the pure 
liberist theories. For example, people might prefer public rather than private ownership of firms, as 
this would create less uncertainty about the stability of jobs.  
 
I introduce two dummies that capture the two extremes of the employment status of the 
respondent. On one side I control for being retired, on the other side for being self-employed. These 
are two extremes in the sense that retirees are no longer affected by the labour market institutions, 
while self-employed are the most affected, as communist regimes tend not to recognize the private 
entrepreneurship. This means that I expect the latter to be strongly pro-competition.  
 
                                                 
4 Hellman (1998) argues that also initial winners can begin opposing to the reforms, as they could fear to run losses if the reforms 
progressed after some point. 
5 Despite the quality of the job and (above all) of the food and the quality of the delivering of the latter (long queues), people had 
access to both at an almost even extent.   7
Eventually in its first years the transition brought rather losses than benefits to the Eastern 
citizens. The deep and fast renovation of the economic system and the obsolescence of the soviet 
productive systems and industries generated an outburst of unemployment and poverty. Millions of 
workers lost their job and retirees knew a severe cut of their pension benefits. A high and persistent 
inflation hit some countries. It is not too difficult to lose optimism and become pessimistic in front 
of such a situation. Therefore the initial desire of market economy could have left its place to the 
whish of going back to the past regimes. This is exactly what the model by Blanchard (1997) 
predicts and what this paper finds. This has to be interpreted as a transitory phenomenon and not as 
a structural opposition to the market economy.    8
3.  Data and methodology 
In order to answer the questions asked in the Introduction, I study four variables which are the 
answers to as many questions. Data are from three waves of the World Value Survey (WVS): 1989 – 
1993, 1994 – 1999 and 1999 – 2004. The responders are almost evenly distributed across these 
waves, so that no re-weighing is necessary. The variables I analyze are strictly linked with the 
fundaments of a market economy. They attain competition per se and preferences for public 
intervention in the economy. The theories of the free and competitive market state that perfect 
competition leads to Pareto efficiency (first theorem of welfare economics) and thus it is good; they 
also state that the public hand has to minimize its interventions in the economic system. The so-
called Western world funds its economic system on this theoretical ground, although some public 
corrections are implemented. However the trend of the past thirty years has been the progressive 
minimization of the public ownership and the reduction of the provision of some public services. 
The new approach has gradually substituted the direct intervention with a ductile regulation. This 
process has been led mainly by the European Commission and the decisions taken by the European 
Council, and thus it is representative of the EU’s vision. If the Eastern European countries want to 
integrate in the EU and to participate actively to its mission, then their citizens must support the 
recalled trend. This is why here I focus on the opinion over competition per se, and the individual 
preferences for the public intervention in the economy.  
 
The first variable that I consider measures the individual evaluation of competition per se; it is 
the answer to the following question: “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How 
would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the 
left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall 
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between
6. Sentences: Competition is good. It 
stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the 
worst in people”. In this case 1 means to consider competition as good and as stimulating people to 
work and to develop new ideas, whilst 10 means to find competition to be harmful.  
 
The second and the third questions attain the role of the government in the economy. 
Specifically, they ask the respondents to grade the following couples of sentences: “Private 
ownership of business should be increased vs. Government ownership of business should be 
increased” and “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The 
government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”. In both cases 
                                                 
6 This part of the question is equal also for the following quotes. As a consequence I will not report it, but I will only quote the 
sentences to be graded.    9
answering 10 definitely means to support the intervention of the government in the economy. In 
both cases the responder’s preference against the rules of competition and of a free capitalistic 
market is stronger as the grade increases.  
 
The fourth question is again about the intervention of the government in the economy, but it 
refers to a different and more modern approach of intervention: regulation. The question asks the 
interviewee to grade his/her preference for the strength of the public regulation over firms. The 
couple of sentences to be graded is: “The state should give more freedom to firms vs. The state 
should control firms more effectively”. Here 1 means to prefer freedom vs. regulation (10). 
Although regulation is not necessary a negative aspect for competition and free market, I interpret 
high marks a lack of trust in how a completely free and competitive market works. Although not 
exhaustive, the analysis of these four variables sheds some light on the preferences of European 
citizens about fundamental characteristics of a market economy.  
 
The investigation involves both univariate and multivariate analysis. In the latter I include 
gender and education as controls for the reasons explained before. Additional regressors are: age, 
political orientation, religious orientation, the size of the interviewee’s town, his/her marital status
7 
and his/her employment status.  
 
Differently from Grier (1997) and Guiso et al. (2003) I do not control for religious 
denominations for the following reason. All the Western countries (excluding Greece) are not 
Christian Orthodox, while the majority of the former communist countries are Orthodox, and 
therefore I would rather identify these countries than the true effect of the denomination should I 
control for it. However I control for being a convinced atheist not to lose completely this 
information that captures and important cultural trait of the responder
8; moreover it allows also for 
better isolating the pure effect of belonging to a certain geo-ideological block. As the communist 
doctrine teaches atheism and in this sense it has been rather successful, Eastern Europeans could be 
more in favour of competition because their preferences are affected by religious rules to a lesser 
extent than Western Europeans’ are. However a different story is possible: under the dictatorships 
religious people were generally persecuted; as a consequence most of them abandoned their 
                                                 
7 In reality I control for a stable relationship, i.e. or married or not married but living together.  
8 It is possible to claim that as atheism can be a legacy of the communist past, the introduction of the dummy for being atheist is 
improper. I acknowledge that this may be a valid point, but I claim that factors other than political doctrines might have affected the 
religious orientation of people in the two blocks, leading to the current situation in which Eastern Europeans are on average more 
atheist than Western citizens are. The following finding supports my claim: the large majority of Eastern countries belong to the 
Orthodox denomination, as Greece does. The orientation of Greeks and Eastern Europeans towards religion does not differ 
significantly in my sample. This means that Greeks are on average as atheist as Eastern Europeans are. Therefore to claim that 
atheism in Eastern Europe is just a legacy of the Communism is incorrect. For this reason I control also for this variable and I claim 
that this does not bias the analysis, but rather it reinforces its results.   10
believes, but some continued organizing themselves in communities defying the repression. The 
membership to these secret communities implied mutual help and solidarity, two values that might 
be in opposition to a market economy. The attitude towards atheism is retrieved from a specific 
question of the World Value Survey: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you 
say you are…”; there are three possible answers to this question: “a religious person”, “not a 
religious person” and “a convinced atheist”. I take the intermediate group (those who classify 
themselves as non religious) as reference group and introduce two dummies: one for those 
respondents who classified themselves as religious persons and one for those who declared to feel 
convinced atheists. 
 
Furthermore I also control for the size of the town in which the responder lives: Firebaugh and 
Sandu (1998) find that Romanian urban residents are more in favour of marketization than people 
living in the countryside; Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) find that people living in suburban districts are 
more likely to support accession of their country (and therefore the continuation of reforms that this 
accession implies) to the EU than inhabitants of the countryside are. The WVS classifies villages 
and towns according to a discrete scale from 1 (villages with less than 2,000 inhabitants) to 8 
(towns with more than 500,000 people). This is an important variable to account for, because people 
who live in relatively big towns have experienced the transition more than inhabitants of the 
countryside. The process of restructuring industries and services affected the main urban centres 
both creating unemployment and poverty at the beginning and generating benefits and new 
opportunities in a second stage. Poverty in the countryside is always mitigated by the possibility of 
tilling and innovations and new opportunities are possible to a reduced extent.  
 
Age is another important control: old people have experienced more institutional changes, and 
thus their preferences are based also on a strong experience in addition to education. At the same 
time, they tend to regret the past. Among others Hayo (1999) finds a U-shaped pattern for age: 
support for a market economy first increases and then decreases. Here I expect the same result at 
least for Eastern Europe. In this region old people experienced the free market before 1946 and 
young people never had a direct contact with the communism regimes. If some indoctrination effect 
holds or people feel some nostalgia of the past regime (see Easterlin and Plagnol, 2008 in the case 
of Eastern German States) these should affect mainly the preferences of people belonging to the 
central age cohorts and, to a lesser extent, the elderly as they should balance nostalgia with the 
experience of the market institutions before the War. 
   11
Eventually I also control for political orientation (this is self-reported by the interviewee and 
ranked on a scale from one – extreme left – to 10 – extreme right); first of all the supporters of 
right-wing parties (i.e. those responders who consider themselves closer to the political right) are 
expected to be in favour of a market economy (see for example Hayo, 2005) and moreover this 
variable also controls for nostalgia in Eastern Europe. Those citizens who feel nostalgia of recent 
history also tend to support the parties which represent that past.  
 
The time path is identified through a discrete variable coding the waves. This variable takes 
the values 1, 2 and 3, which are increasing in time. This means that the 1989 – 1993 wave is coded 
as 1, the following wave as 2, and the last one as 3. This allows for assessing whether there is a 
change of these preferences over the time, which is not captured by the previous controls. 
 
I analyze firstly the whole sample in order to answer the main question of this paper, i.e. 
whether the Europeans from the former communist countries and the Europeans from the Western 
block support competition and the free market to a different extent. Secondly I analyze the two sub-
samples (Western and Eastern blocks) in order to check if the effects of the individual 
characteristics detected in the full-sample analysis vary across the sub-samples.   12
4.  Results 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the answers for the considered variables. We can notice that 
the largest majority of both Eastern and Western Europeans considers competition not to be harmful 
(a grade lower than 6); however a larger fraction of Western Europeans (20.07%) than of Eastern 
citizens (15,70%) evaluates competition as harmful. Despite these results, Eastern European prefer 
the firms to be owned by the government more than their Western counterpart and the same holds 
for preferring more government responsibility in ensuring that everybody is provided for. These 
results appear to be in contrast with the previous findings: while Eastern Europeans have a better 
opinion about competition than Western have, these ask for lesser State intervention in the economy 
than Eastern whish. It is possible that for Eastern citizens the term “competition” represents the 
freedom from Communism and therefore it represents more an ideal than real competition per se
9. It 
is possible that Eastern Europeans like competition, but they are afraid of losing their job, hence 
they consider state ownership as an insurance against this risk. However an alternative explanation 
is possible: Staniszkis (1991) and Roland (2000) argue that Eastern Europeans have tended to 
support small-scale privatization and to oppose to large-scale privatization; Barlow and Radulescu 
(2005) and Kim and Pirttilä (2006) find empirical evidence which is partially consistent with this 
hypothesis. Thus it might be that the findings of my analysis are led by the opposition to large-scale 
privatization, or, in other words, that the effect of this opposition prevails on the support for small-
scale privatization. 
 
Table 2 shows the results of testing the sub-groups’ means; we can notice that the difference 
between the two blocks is always highly significant and the shown figures are consistent with the 
previous results. I can not claim that these differences are a legacy of the communist regimes, but I 
highlight that there are persistent differences between Eastern and Western Europe about the 
opinion on competition and some related preferences attaining the institutions of a market economy.  
 
 Tables 3 and 4 are analogous to Table 2, but in them the sub-samples are divided also by the 
responder’s gender. This further analysis is due to two main (antagonist) reasons. First: the 
communist doctrines teach that men and women are equal, especially for what attains work
10. 
Second: the economic literature often highlights that women are more risk averse than men are, and 
the transition from a socialist to a market economy tends to increase the variance of wages and the 
probability of losing the job. The two tables highlight that the detected differences hold for the two 
geographic sub-samples also when I cluster by gender. This evidence suggests that Eastern and 
                                                 
9 However this is just a possible interpretation and the present analysis does not offer any supportive or contrary evidence. 
10 Of course the implementation of this high principle has often failed also in communist countries, but I have to account 1) for some 
indoctrination effect and 2) for some successful implementation of the ideology.   13
Western European are different from each other independently of gender (or equivalently that both 
men and women have different preferences by block). Further analyses
11 also show that the gender 
effect is highly significant in both geographic blocks. These findings suggest that current 
preferences about competition are not affected by the communist principles, or, if so, that the 
gender effect is stronger than the doctrine. My results are in favour of the hypothesis that women 
like the consequences of a market economy less than men do, and therefore they support 
competition less. These findings suggest that Western and Eastern Europeans deeply differ in their 
support to a market economy, and a full integration seems to be still far from the current situation.  
 
The second important topic I consider here is the evolution of the preferences over the time. 
As I have highlighted in the Introduction, only twenty years have elapsed since the fall of the 
communist regimes. During this period a true revolution has overwhelmed Eastern Europe. As a 
consequence of the initial diseases caused by the transition, the preferences of the population for the 
market institutions could have varied significantly. However also in Western Europe preferences 
and opinions might have varied over the time. Table 5 reports the average responses clustered by 
geographic zone. Two remarks are very important: first the differences have increased during the 
first phase of transition, and then they have decreased and 2) only the difference relative to the 
opinion on competition has reached a level lower than the initial figure. The first phenomenon is 
consistent with my hypothesis that the initial phases of the transition shattered the high hopes of the 
change. Eastern populations first expected the revolution to be radical but painless, then they 
experienced the necessary reorganization of the economies and its negative side. Eventually, as the 
situation started normalizing and bettering off, the support to the market economy has began to 
grow again. However the distance between Eastern and Western Europeans remains pronounced 
and highly significant.  
 
The next tables show the results of  the multivariate analysis. Given the nature of the data, 
ordered probit are used. The added value of these regressions is that it allows for isolating the 
“geographic effect” from other characteristics (those listed in sections 2 and 3) they may affect the 
preferences. Tables 6, 9, 12 and 15 confirm that the difference between Eastern and Western Europe 
is robust and highly significant. Moreover both the signs of the coefficients and the magnitude of 
the marginal effects the support previous findings. I have to add an important observation about the 
sign of the marginal effects. Each question asked the interviewee to position him/herself about a 
couple of sentences. This is equivalent to grade both sentences with two numbers (one for each 
                                                 
11 Available upon request.   14
sentence), whose sum is always constrained to ten
12. Therefore when the overall effect is negative 
the marginal effects have to move from a positive to a negative figure and vice versa. This explains 
what can be observed in all the tables from Table 6 to table 17. The inclusion of the individual’s 
political orientation and education level among the controls ensures that the differences detected in 
the first tables are not due to just a political preference (perhaps dependent on the historical legacy) 
or to different educative levels (which may depend on the past regimes
13), but they are deeply 
rooted in the individuals’ culture. 
 
The second important variable that I consider is the variation of the preferences over the time. 
Here the multivariate analysis captures the overall trend. As a consequence it fails in highlighting 
the negative jump of preferences detected before. We can notice is that Western Europeans consider 
competition more and more harmful, consistently with the figures reported in Table 5. The time 
discontinuity already detected for Eastern Europe makes the coefficient non significant. This also 
means that none of the effects (first the worsening of the opinion and than its improvement) prevails 
on the other. This is not the case for the other considered variables. The preference for an increasing 
government ownership of firms (see Tables 9, 10 and 11) shows a diminishing trend overall in 
Europe, and the same result holds for both the sub-samples. This means that the variation of 
preferences between the second and the third wave of the survey is stronger than the change 
between the first and the second wave; a good news if we believe that integration is important and 
that it relies also on people’s preferences.  
 
Tables 11 and 14 confirm the last finding: the variation between the second and the third 
considered waves prevails on the variation between the first and the second. Again this is a good 
result in the sense of pointing out that both Eastern and Western Europeans are preferring a market 
economy more and more. They are going in the same direction as European policies are. I am not 
discussing here the merit of these policies (i.e. whether they are adequate for the Union and its 
social situation or not), but I am emphasizing that the population’s preferences are supportive of the 
implemented policies. This is already a good result, as the process towards integration and market 
economy appears to be solidly stable.  
 
Another interesting result is relative to the level of education of the responder. As expected, in 
Western Europe the higher the education the more supportive of market economy the responder is. 
The economic rationale for this is that education is rewarded by a market economy more than by a 
                                                 
12 See section 3.  
13 The geographic mobility was severely restricted also inside each country during the communist dictatorship; hence this could have 
reduced the number of graduated people.   15
socialist system, therefore those who already live in a market economy have interest in supporting 
the status quo. In Eastern Europe the same positive link holds: more educated people support the 
market economy more than lesser educated responders. This can have at least two possible 
interpretation. The first is the higher rentability of education in a market than in a socialist 
economy; the second is an effect of education per se: although the school system was used to spread 
the communist doctrine, learning opens the mind. Therefore the shortcomings of the communist 
regimes were more evident to more educated people than to the other citizens and consequently 
individuals with a high degree are more in favour of the new system, rather than on the old. Of 
course it is likely that these two interpretation sum up in Eastern Europe reinforcing each other. 
 
As for the other considered variables, my analysis confirms the gender effect: women support 
a market economy less than men, self-employed and right-wing people support it more than persons 
with other employment status or political orientation (this is consistent with my initial hypotheses). 
The size of the town associates positively overall, but only in a couple of cases (see Tables 6 and 
12) the coefficients and the marginal effects are highly significant. This results hide a more complex 
reality: the size of town presents a significant coefficient in the Western sub-sample always. In 
particular the magnitude of the urban centre positively correlates with anti-market preferences and 
opinions. This is probably due to the high presence of blue-collars in big Western towns and to the 
recent phenomenon of increasing unemployment among industrial blue-collars
14. For the Eastern 
European sub-sample the situation is different. As I have already discussed, people living in big 
towns are those who suffered the negative side of the transition the most, but they are also those 
who are benefitting of the economic recovery the most (here I call this the “transition hypothesis”). 
This might explain the lack of significance of the coefficient linked to the size of the town: people 
living in big urban agglomeration could have first opposed to the transition, and then support it, as 
the weakly significant coefficient of Table 11 may let suppose. The lack of significance should 
hence be determined by the sum of the two opposite effects
15.  
 
Eventually being atheist is associated with a preference for wide social policies and strong 
regulation over firms in Western Europe, whilst the opposite holds in Eastern Europe. This confirms 
the hypothesis that belonging to a religious community under a communist dictatorship developed a 
sentiment of solidarity and mutual help among members. This is an indirect effect of the past 
regimes through their attempt of eradicating religious believes.  
                                                 
14 See the Eurostat reports.  
15 Further results (available upon request) show that the correlation between the size of the town and people’s preferences has varied 
overt the time in Eastern Europe. However the variation is supportive of the transition hypothesis only in one case (the preference for 
increasing the government ownership of firms).   16
  
The picture of Europe that emerges from this analysis is that of a continent which is still 
separated by a wall: in the Eastern countries people tend to consider competition better than in the 
West (perhaps because it represent the “new ideology”), but they whish a role of the State as 
employer and regulator more than Western European whish (and this tends to confirm the previous 
statement).   17
5.  Conclusions 
This paper provides some new evidence about three important aspects of the European 
integration process: it shows that 1) Eastern and Western Europeans still differ significantly in their 
support to a free market; 2) while in Western Europe this support has constantly decreased over the 
time, the path in Eastern countries is uncertain; 3) it is still possible, among personal characteristics, 
to individuate differences which may suggest the presence of a communist legacy.  
 
The results of the analysis suggest that in the European continent (and since a few years in the 
European Union) the perception of competition and the people’s preferences towards the 
establishment of a free market are still different on a geographic base. This base reflects the recent 
history of Europe, and more precisely its division into two blocks: the “capitalistic” in the West and 
the “communist” in the East. Despite the presence of both a communist legacy (testified by a 
preference for Government intervention in the economy stronger in Western Europe than in the 
former communist countries) and a reaction to the past (identified by an opinion of competition 
better in Eastern Europe than in the Western block) is not surprising, however it suggests the 
possibility of a future slow down of the integration. Eastern governments could be cautious in 
fastening the reforms in order not to annoy the populations and lose the elections.  
 
However the highlighted differences do not appear to be a serious obstacle to the process of 
integration as the European Eastern countries have not yet fully benefited from the reforms, whose 
effects will be complete in the future. The transitory negative impact of the “capitalistic revolution” 
that affected these countries has increased uncertainty and temporarily increased poverty; this might 
have induced some people (especially the least educated) to regret the past. This paper is an attempt 
to understand if the convergence process towards Western standards has involved also people’s 
preferences for a free market, if there is a stable path of this convergence (provided any), and if the 
basis of the process are solid. The answers I suggest are mixed. If some convergence has taken 
place in the opinion about competition, this has to be ascribed to the Western citizens, whose 
perception of competition has worsen over the time. Secondly, the preference for increasing public 
ownership of firms is stronger in Eastern than in Western Europe and the trend over the time 
suggests that Western Europeans prefer more and more the private property, while for the Eastern 
citizens the path is mixed (although it is overall similar to the Western’s): first they increased their 
preference for public ownership and then they reversed their preference. This phenomenon is likely 
to be the result of the severe worsening of the economic conditions during the first years of the 
transition. Afterwards, when the benefits of the reforms started to be appreciable, the populations   18
changed their mind. The same path is observable for the preference about the provision of welfare 
by the government (but also in this case the overall result is for some convergence).  
 
In sum this paper suggests that the reforms implemented in the Eastern countries to bring their 
economic institutions to the free market have initially created divergence of people’s preferences 
with respect to the Western citizens, and some convergence after the first benefits started to be 























































Table 1. Distribution of answers to free market and competition indicators.
(Percentage figures)
Western Eastern Western Eastern
1 18.52 31.79 14.43 14.85
2 13.82 13.63 10.47 8.17
3 17.83 15.29 15.20 11.24
4 13.55 10.14 12.45 9.09
5 16.21 13.45 22.73 17.69
6 6.19 4.37 8.62 7.57
7 4.59 3.13 5.70 6.54
8 4.21 3.21 5.24 8.27
9 1.98 1.55 2.13 5.33
10 3.10 3.46 3.05 11.26
St. deviation 2.34 2.42 2.31 2.90
Western Eastern Western Eastern
1 13.47 8.47 12.39 12.31
2 9.23 4.62 9.17 6.32
3 13.23 7.50 12.32 7.43
4 10.85 6.78 10.41 5.90
5 15.41 12.17 19.98 14.29
6 8.76 11.13 8.44 6.80
7 8.18 8.44 8.47 7.32
8 8.81 11.15 8.42 11.84
9 4.53 8.30 3.86 9.02
10 7.54 21.45 6.55 18.77
St. deviation 2.73 2.92 2.61 3.08
Competition is harmful More public ownership
More Government responsibility More regulation over firms  20
 
 
Table 5. Evolution over the time of the average responses for the two blocks
More Government ownership of firms
          1989 - 1993 4.20 4.67 -0,47 ***
          1994 - 1999 4.47 5.38 -0,91 ***
          1999 - 2004 4.28 5.03 -0,75 ***
More Government responsibility in the economy 
          1989 - 1993 4.77 5.49 -0,72 ***
          1994 - 1999 5.26 7.11 -1,85 ***
          1999 - 2004 4.89 6.09 -1,20 ***
Competition is harmful
          1989 - 1993 3.78 2.92 0,86 ***
          1994 - 1999 3.65 3.47 0,18 ***
          1999 - 2004 4.04 3.53 0,51 ***









Table 2. Raw preferences of  Western and the Eastern Europeans. Average figures
Western Eastern Sign.
More Government ownership of firms 4.27 5.08 ***
More Government responsibility in the economy 4.88 6.32 ***
Competition is harmful 3.87 3.35 ***
More regulation over firms 4.87 5.98 ***
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
Table 3. Raw preferences of male Western and the Eastern Europeans. Average figures
Western Eastern Sign.
More Government ownership of firms 4.13 4.76 ***
More Government responsibility in the economy 4.74 6.14 ***
Competition is harmful 3.70 3.18 ***
More regulation over firms 4.72 5.77 ***
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
Table 4. Raw preferences of female Western and the Eastern Europeans. Average figures
Western Eastern Sign.
More Government ownership of firms 4.41 5.36 ***
More Government responsibility in the economy  5.02 6.49 ***
Competition is harmful 4.02 3.50 ***
More regulation over firms 5.00 6.16 ***
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.  21
Table 6. Ordered probit analysis for considering competition as harmful
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Western Europe 0.23 -1.67 -0.43 0.77 2.31 1.35 1.18 1.31 0.66 1.51
(0.01)*** (0.07)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.10)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)*** (0.01)***
Male -0.13 0.91 0.21 -0.46 -1.31 -0.75 -0.66 -0.72 -0.36 -0.81
(0.01)*** (0.07)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.10)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)***
Wave 0.06 -0.41 -0.09 0.20 0.58 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.16 0.36
(0.01)*** (0.07)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.10)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)***
Atheist 0.05 -0.37 -0.01 0.17 0.50 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.15 0.33
(0.02)** (0.16)** n.s. (0.06)*** (0.21)** (0.12)*** (0.11)** (0.12)** (0.06)** (0.14)**
Education -0.03 0.18 0.04 -0.09 -0.26 -0.15 -0.13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.16
(0.002)*** (0.02)*** (0.004)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Size of town 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.002)*** (0.01)*** (0.003)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Retired 0.04 -0.28 -0.07 0.13 0.39 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.11 0.25
(0.02)** (0.13)** (0.04)* (0.06)** (0.18)** (0.10)** (0.09)** (0.10)** (0.05)** (0.12)**
Self - employed -0.16 1.00 0.07 0.68 -1.68 -0.91 -0.77 -0.83 -0.41 -0.87
(0.02)*** (0.11)*** (0.02)*** (0.10)*** (0.23)*** (0.12)*** (0.10)*** (0.10)*** (0.05)*** (0.10)***
Political Orientation -0.05 0.38 0.09 -0.19 -0.55 -0.31 -0.27 -0.30 -0.15 -0.34
(0.002)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Age
1 0.46 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
(0.18)*** (0.01)*** (0.003)** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Age squared
1 -0.004 >0 >0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0 <0
(0.02)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Stable relationship -0.05 0.32 0.08 -0.16 -0.46 -0.27 -0.23 -0.26 -0.13 -0.29
(0.01)*** (0.08)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.11)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.03) (0.07)
Pr (y = n) 14.04 17.06 12.61 15.08 5.60 3.98 3.64 1.56 2.75
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 7. Ordered probit analysis for considering competition as harmful (Western Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.15 1.45 0.72 -0.31 -1.43 -0.97 -0.87 -0.97 -0.48 -0.88
(0.01)*** (0.14)*** (0.07)*** (0.04)*** (0.14)*** (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.05)*** (0.09)***
Wave 0.16 -1.55 -0.77 0.33 1.52 1.03 0.93 1.04 0.51 0.93
(0.02)*** (0.17)*** (0.08)*** (0.04)*** (0.17)*** (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.06)*** (0.10)***
Atheist 0.07 -0.71 -0.38 0.12 0.66 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.24 0.45
(0.03)** (0.30)** (0.17)** (0.04)*** (0.26)** (0.19)** (0.18)** (0.20)** (0.10)** (0.20)**
Education -0.02 0.15 0.08 -0.03 -0.15 -0.10 -0.09 -0.1 -0.05 -0.09
(0.003)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.00)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Size of town 0.02 -0.15 -0.08 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.09
(0.003)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Retired 0.02 -0.15 -0.08 0.03 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.09
(0.03) (0.27) (0.14) (0.05) (0.26) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) (0.09) (0.16)
Self - employed -0.15 1.41 0.57 -0.45 -1.56 -0.99 -0.87 -0.94 -0.45 -0.79
(0.03)*** (0.26)*** (0.08)*** (0.12)*** (0.33)*** (0.20)*** (0.17)*** (0.18)*** (0.08)*** (0.14)***
Political Orientation -0.08 0.78 0.39 -0.17 -0.76 -0.52 -0.47 -0.52 -0.26 -0.47
(0.004)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)***
Age
1 0.22 -0.02 -0.01 n.s. 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.26) (0.03) (0.01) n.s. (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared
1 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Stable relationship -0.05 0.44 0.22 -0.09 -0.43 -0.29 -0.27 -0.30 -0.15 -0.27
(0.02)*** (0.16)*** (0.08)*** (0.03)*** (0.15)*** (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.11)*** (0.05)*** (0.10)***
Pr (y = n) 13.56 17.83 14.68 16.87 6.78 4.80 4.31 1.78 2.53
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 8. Ordered probit analysis for considering competition as harmful (Eastern Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.12 0.60 -0.06 -0.50 -1.23 -0.63 -0.54 -0.59 -0.31 -0.80
(0.01)*** (0.07)*** (0.01)*** (0.05)*** (0.13)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.03)*** (0.09)***
Wave 0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07
(0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08)
Atheist 0.01 -0.05 n.s. 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06
(0.03) (0.16) n.s. (0.13) (0.31) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.08) (0.21)
Education -0.03 0.18 -0.02 -0.15 -0.36 -0.18 -0.16 -0.17 -0.09 -0.23
(0.003)*** (0.02)*** (0.004)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Size of town 0.001 0.01 n.s. -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 n.s. -0.01
(0.002) (0.01) n.s. (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) n.s. (0.02)
Retired 0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.10
(0.02) (0.12) (0.01) (0.10) (0.25) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.16)
Self - employed -0.16 0.66 -0.27 -0.77 -1.70 -0.82 -0.68 -0.74 -0.37 -0.93
(0.03)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.15)*** (0.31)*** (0.14)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.06)*** (0.14)***
Political Orientation -0.04 0.18 -0.02 -0.15 -0.37 -0.19 -0.16 -0.18 -0.09 -0.24
(0.00)*** (0.02)*** (0.004)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Age
1 0.21 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.25) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age squared
1 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Stable relationship -0.03 0.13 -0.01 -0.11 -0.27 -0.14 -0.12 -0.13 -0.07 -0.18
(0.01)* (0.08)* (0.007)* (0.06)* (0.16)* (0.08)* (0.07)* (0.08)* (0.04)* (0.10)*
Pr (y = n) 14.17 16.26 11.00 13.76 4.76 3.42 3.21 1.43 2.95
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
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Table 9. Ordered probit analysis for supporting more Government ownership of firms
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Western Europe -0.28 2.32 1.94 0.66 -1.15 -1.39 -1.49 -2.10 -1.45 -3.39
(0.01)*** (0.10)*** (0.08)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.09)*** (0.06)*** (0.14)***
Male -0.16 1.34 1.17 0.44 -0.57 -0.78 -0.85 -1.22 -0.85 -2.04
(0.01)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.06)*** (0.14)***
Wave -0.12 1.01 0.88 0.33 -0.43 -0.59 -0.64 -0.92 -0.64 -1.53
(0.01)*** (0.09)*** (0.08)*** (0.03)*** (0.04) (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.06)*** (0.14)***
Atheist 0.12 -0.98 -0.90 -0.38 0.29 0.53 0.60 0.89 0.64 1.59
(0.02)*** (0.19)*** (0.19)*** (0.09)*** (0.04)*** (0.10)*** (0.12)*** (0.18)*** (0.13)*** (0.34)***
Education -0.04 0.31 0.27 0.10 -0-13 -0.18 -0.20 -0.28 -0.20 -0.47
(0.003)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)***
Size of town 0.002 -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.002) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Retired 0.08 -0.68 -0.61 -0.24 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.62 0.44 1.07
(0.02)*** (0.17)*** (0.15)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.15)*** (0.11)*** (0.27)***
Self - employed -0.35 2.81 2.02 0.36 -2.23 -1.95 -1.92 -2.56 -1.66 -3.54
(0.02)*** (0.17)*** (0.09)*** (0.03)*** (0.20)*** (0.13)*** (0.12)*** (0.15)*** (0.10)*** (0.18)***
Political Orientation -0.08 0.68 0.59 0.22 -0.29 -0.39 -0.42 -0.61 -0.43 -1.02
(0.003)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Age
1 1.33 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.17
(0.20)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)***
Age squared
1 - 0 . 0 1 > 0> 0> 0< 0< 0< 0< 0< 0< 0
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Stable relationship -0.02 0.19 0.16 0.06 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.17 -0.12 -0.28
(0.01)* (0.10)* (0.09)* (0.03)* (0.04)* (0.06)* (0.06)* (0.09)* (0.06)* (0.16)*
Pr (y = n) 9.02 12.82 11.42 20.99 8.62 6.60 7.11 3.90 6.58
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 10. Ordered probit analysis for supporting more Government ownership of firms (Western Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.15 1.47 1.19 0.24 -1.36 -1.20 -0.98 -1.13 -0.56 -0.91
(0.02)*** (0.16)*** (0.13)*** (0.03)*** (0.15)*** (0.13)*** (0.11)*** (0.13)*** (0.07)*** (0.10)***
Wave -0.06 0.60 0.49 0.10 -0.56 -0.49 -0.40 -0.47 -0.23 -0.37
(0.02)*** (0.18)*** (0.14)*** (0.03)*** (0.16)*** (0.14)*** (0.12)*** (0.14)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)***
Atheist 0.13 -1.22 -1.05 -0.29 0.98 0.97 0.82 0.97 0.49 0.83
(0.03)*** (0.33)*** (0.30)*** (0.10)*** (0.22)*** (0.25)*** (0.22)*** (0.27)*** (0.14)*** (0.25)***
Education -0.04 0.38 0.30 0.06 -0.35 -0.31 -0.25 -0.29 -0.14 -0.23
(0.004)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
Size of town 0.01 -0.14 -0.11 -0.02 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.09
(0.004)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.006)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)***
Retired 0.03 -0.26 -0.21 -0.05 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.10 0.17
(0.03) (0.31) (0.26) (0.06) (0.28) (0.25) (0.21) (0.24) (0.12) (0.20)
Self - employed -0.19 1.79 1.28 0.09 -1.99 -1.51 -1.19 -1.32 -0.62 -0.97
(0.03)*** (0.31)*** (0.19)*** (0.03)*** (0.40)*** (0.27)*** (0.20)*** (0.22)*** (0.10)*** (0.15)***
Political Orientation -0.11 10.5 0.84 0.17 -0.97 -0.85 -0.70 -0.81 -0.39 -0.65
(0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.02)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)***
Age
1 -0.32 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
(0.32) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Age squared
1 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Stable relationship -0.01 0.12 0.10 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07
(0.02) (0.18) (0.15) (0.03) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11)
Pr (y = n) 10.39 15.30 13.77 23.82 8.96 5.45 4.95 1.98 2.53
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 11. Ordered probit analysis for supporting more Government ownership of firms (Eastern Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.16 1.30 1.15 0.51 -0.17 -0.55 -0.74 -1.22 -0.99 -2.78
(0.01)*** (0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.10)*** (0.08)*** (0.23)***
Wave -0.14 1.11 0.98 0.44 -0.15 -0.47 -0.63 -1.04 -0.84 -2.36
(0.01)*** (0.11)*** (0.09)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.10)*** (0.08)*** (0.22)***
Atheist 0.08 -0.66 -0.61 -0.29 0.03 0.26 0.36 0.62 0.51 1.48
(0.03)*** (0.26)*** (0.24)** (0.12)** (0.02)* (0.09)*** (0.13)*** (0.24)*** (0.20)** (0.60)**
Education -0.04 0.31 0.27 0.12 -0.04 -0.13 -0.18 -0.29 -0.24 -0.66
(0.003)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.06)***
Size of town -0.005 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08
(0.003)* (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.01)* (0.003)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.02)* (0.02)* (0.04)*
Retired 0.07 -0.53 -0.48 -0.22 0.05 0.21 0.29 0.49 0.40 1.15
(0.03)*** (0.21)*** (0.19)** (0.09)** (0.01)*** (0.08)*** (0.11)*** (0.19)*** (0.16)** (0.46)**
Self - employed -0.46 3.30 2.32 0.51 -2.09 -2.00 -2.29 -3.35 -2.46 -5.83
(0.03)*** (0.19)*** (0.10)*** (0.05)*** (0.23)*** (0.16)*** (0.16)*** (0.21)*** (0.15)*** (0.28)***
Political Orientation -0.06 0.51 0.45 0.20 -0.07 -0.21 -0.28 -0.48 -0.39 -1.02
(0.004)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.06)***
Age
1 1.47 -0.12 -0.10 -0.05 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.25
(0.27)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.004)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.05)***
Age squared
1 - 0 . 0 8 > 0> 0> 0< 0< 0< 0< 0< 0 - 0 . 0 1
(0.003)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Stable relationship -0.01 (0.01) 0.01 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -0.01 n.s -0.01
(0.02) (0.13) (0.11) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. (0.12) n.s (0.27)
Pr (y = n) 8.32 11.43 9.98 18.93 8.18 7.16 8.37 5.13 9.47
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
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Table 12. Ordered probit analysis for desiring more responsibility of the Government to ensure that everyone is provided for
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Western Europe -0.49 3.36 4.23 2.50 1.60 -0.59 -1.77 -3.45 -3.17 -10.45
(0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.21)***
Male -0.07 0.47 0.61 0.37 0.26 -0.56 -0.23 -0.48 -0.45 -1.52
(0.01)*** (0.06)*** (0.08)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.20)***
Wave -0.32 2.17 2.81 1.72 1.21 -0.26 -1.08 -2.21 -2.08 -6.98
(0.01)*** (0.08)*** (0.10)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)*** (0.08)*** (0.08)*** (0.23)***
Atheist 0.01 -0.11 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.36
(0.02) (0.14) (0.18) (0.11) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) (0.14) (0.13) (0.46)
Education -0.05 0.32 0.42 0.26 0.18 -0.04 -0.16 -0.33 -0,31 -1.04
(0.002)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.004)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.05)***
Size of town 0.005 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.004 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.10
(0.002)** (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.002)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.04)**
Retired 0.06 -0.39 -0.51 -0.32 -0.23 0.04 0.19 0.40 0.38 1.30
(0.02)*** (0.12)*** (0.16)*** (0.10)*** (0.07)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.12)*** (0.11)*** (0.40)***
Self - employed -0.15 1.08 1.33 0.76 0.44 -0.25 -0.61 -1.13 -1.01 -3.13
(0.02)*** (0.15)*** (0.18)*** (0.09)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.09)*** (0.16)*** (0.14)*** (0.39)***
Political Orientation -0.06 0.43 0.56 0.34 0.24 -0.05 -0.21 -0.44 -0.41 -1.38
(0.002)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.005)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.06)***
Age
1 0.57 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.004 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.12
(0.17)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.001)*** (0.01)*** (0.01) (0.01)*** (0.04)***
Age squared
1 - 0 . 0 1 > 0> 0> 0> 0< 0< 0< 0< 0< 0
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Stable relationship -0.02 0.16 0.21 0.13 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.17 -0.16 -0.52
(0.01)** (0.07)** (0.09)** (0.06)** (0.04)** (0.01)** (0.004)** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.24)**
Pr (y = n) 5.48 9.74 9.16 14.08 12.34 9.72 10.83 6.91 13.75
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 13. Ordered probit analysis for desiring more responsibility of the Government to ensure that everyone is provided for (Western Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.08 0.67 0.70 0.28 -0.08 -0.34 -0.53 -0.75 -0.47 -1.07
(0.01)*** (0.12)*** (0.12)*** (0.05)*** (0.02)*** (0.06)*** (0.09)*** (0.13)*** (0.08)*** (0.18)***
Wave -0.21 1.73 1.81 0.73 -0.22 -0.87 -1.37 -1.95 -1.23 -2.79
(0.02)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.07)*** (0.03)*** (0.08)*** (0.12)*** (0.17)*** (0.11)*** (0.24)***
Atheist 0.10 -0.79 -0.86 -0.37 0.03 0.36 0.61 0.89 0.58 1.36
(0.03)*** (0.23)*** (0.26)*** (0.12)*** (0.02)** (0.10)*** (0.17)*** (0.26)*** (0.18)*** (0.43)***
Education -0.04 0.14 0.31 0.12 -0.04 -0.15 -0.23 -0.33 -0.21 -0.47
(0.003)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Size of town 0.02 -0.14 -0.14 -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.22
(0.003)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.006)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.04)***
Retired -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07
(0.03) (0.22) (0.23) (0.09) (0.03) (0.11) (0.18) (0.25) (0.16) (0.36)
Self - employed -0.15 1.22 1.20 0.41 -0.91 -0.70 -1.01 -1.37 -0.83 -1.78
(0.03)*** (0.24)*** (0.22)*** (0.06)*** (0.09)*** (0.15)*** (0.21)*** (0.27)*** (0.16)*** (0.32)***
Political Orientation -0.07 0.61 0.64 0.26 -0.08 -0.31 -0.48 -0.69 -0.43 -0.98
(0.004)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.05)***
Age
1 -0.82 0.07 0.07 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.11
(0.26)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.003)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02) (0.01)*** (0.03)***
Age squared
1 0.01 <0 <0 <0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0 >0
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Stable relationship 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.12
(0.02) (0.13) (0.14) (0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.09) (0.21)
Pr (y = n) 7.97 13.17 11.72 16.16 10.14 9.32 8.95 4.27 6.75
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 14. Ordered probit analysis for desiring more responsibility of the Government to ensure that everyone is provided for (Eastern Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.06 0.32 0.47 0.33 0.35 0.14 -0.06 -0.26 -0.35 -1.68
(0.01)*** (0.07)*** (0.10)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.35)***
Wave -0.36 1.98 2.87 2.03 2.17 0.86 -0.36 -1.61 -2.15 -10.31
(0.01)*** (0.09)*** (0.12)*** (0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.36)***
Atheist -0.07 0.41 0.59 0.41 0.43 0.15 -0.10 -0.36 -0.45 -2.07
(0.03)*** (0.17)** (0.23)*** (0.16)*** (0.16)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)** (0.15)** (0.18)** (0.78)***
Education -0.06 0.31 0.45 0.32 0.34 0.14 -0.06 -0.26 -0.34 -1.63
(0.003)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.09)***
Size of town -0.030 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 n.s. -0.02 -0.02 -0.10
(0.003) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) n.s. (0.01) (0.02) (0.07)
Retired 0.07 -0.38 -0.56 -0.40 -0.43 -0.19 0.06 0.30 0.41 2.04
(0.02)*** (0.13)*** (0.18)*** (0.13)*** (0.15)*** (0.07)*** (0.02)*** (0.10)*** (0.13)*** (0.69)***
Self - employed -0.15 0.88 1.24 0.84 0.83 0.23 -0.25 -0.79 -0.96 -4.16
(0.03)*** (0.17)*** (0.23)*** (0.15)*** (0.14)*** (0.02)*** (0.07)*** (0.17)*** (0.19)*** (0.73)***
Political Orientation -0.05 0.29 0.41 0.29 0.31 0.12 -0.05 -0.23 -0.31 -1.45
(0.003)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.09)***
Age
1 1.28 -0.07 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.36
(0.24)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.07)***
Age squared
1 - 0 . 0 1 > 0> 0> 0> 0> 0< 0< 0< 0< 0
(0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)***
Stable relationship -0.03 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.07 -0.03 -0.13 -0.17 -0.84
(0.01)** (0.08)** (0.12)** (0.08)** (0.09)** (0.04)* (0.01)** (0.06)** (0.09)** (0.42)**
Pr (y = n) 3.95 7.30 6.99 11.66 13.22 9.44 11.71 8.77 20.59
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
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Table 15. Ordered probit analysis for preferring a stronger regulation for firms
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Western Europe -0.41 0.33 3.03 1.59 0.62 -0.86 -1.73 -3.40 -2.77 -7.44
(0.01)*** (0.13)*** (0.12)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.04)*** (0.07)*** (0.13)*** (0.11)*** (0.27)***
Male -0.11 0.86 0.77 0.39 0.09 -0.26 -0.48 -0.90 -0.71 -1.82
(0.01)*** (0.10)*** (0.09)*** (0.05)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)*** (0.11)*** (0.09)*** (0.22)***
Atheist 0.09 -0.74 -0.69 -0.36 -0.15 0.19 0.39 0.77 0.62 1.66
(0.03)*** (0.22)*** (0.21)*** (0.12)*** (0.07)** (0.05)*** (0.11)*** (0.23)*** (0.19)*** (0.53)***
Education -0.05 0.39 0.35 0.17 0.04 -0.11 -0.21 -0.40 -0.32 -0.81
(0.003)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.06)***
Size of town 0.003 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(0.03) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Retired 0.08 -0.63 -0.58 -0.29 n.s. 0.18 0.34 0.66 0.53 1.38
(0.02)*** (0.19)*** (0.18)*** (0.09)*** n.s. (0.05)*** (0.10)*** (0.20)*** (0.16)*** (0.43)***
Self - employed -0.33 2.60 2.04 0.79 -0.55 -1.11 -1.71 -2.85 -2.06 -4.62
(0.03)*** (0.22)*** (0.15)*** (0.04)*** (0.13)*** (0.13)*** (0.17)*** (0.25)*** (0.17)*** (0.33)***
Political Orientation -0.08 0.68 0.61 0.31 0.08 -0.20 -0.38 -0.71 -0.56 -1.44
(0.004)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)***
Age
1 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.005 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.08
(0.002)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.002)** (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.04)**
Age squared
1 n . s n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Stable relationship 0.004 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 n.s. 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.08
(0.01) (0.12) (0.10) (0.05) n.s. (0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.10) (0.25)
Pr (y = n) 7.91 10.56 9.08 18.15 8.36 8.66 10.34 5.84 9.68
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 16. Ordered probit analysis for preferring a stronger regulation for firms (Western Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.10 0.93 0.77 0.29 -0.25 -0.43 -0.67 -0.95 -0.53 -1.16
(0.02)*** (0.15)*** (0.13)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)*** (0.16)*** (0.09)*** (0.19)***
Atheist 0.17 -1.57 -1.40 -0.63 0.18 0.65 1.08 1.64 0.95 2.22
(0.04)*** (0.33)*** (0.31)*** (0.18)*** (0.04)*** (0.12)*** (0.21)*** (0.34)*** (0.21)*** (0.52)***
Education -0.02 0.23 0.19 0.07 0.04 -0.11 -0.16 -0.23 -0,13 -0.28
(0.004)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.05)***
Size of town 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08
(0.003)* (0.03)* (0.03)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.02)* (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.04)*
Retired n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Self - employed -0.30 2.66 1.89 0.46 -1.44 -1.48 -2.06 -2.68 -1.41 -2.78
(0.03)*** (0.30)*** (0.18)*** (0.03)*** (0.24)*** (0.19)*** (0.24)*** (0.29)*** (0.15)*** (0.26)***
Political Orientation -0.10 0.94 0.77 0.30 -0.25 -0.44 -0.68 -0.96 -0.54 -1.17
(0.005)*** (0.05)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.03)*** (0.06)***
Age
1 -0.08 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(0.30) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Age squared
1 n . s n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .n . s .
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Stable relationship 0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.12
(0.02) (0.17) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.22)
Pr (y = n) 9.41 12.74 10.98 19.84 8.57 8.64 8.54 3.66 5.71
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
1 Rescaled: coefficient and s.e. multiplied for 100
Table 17. Ordered probit analysis for preferring a stronger regulation for firms (Eastern Europe)
Coefficient y = 2 y = 3 y = 4 y = 5 y = 6 y = 7 y = 8 y = 9 y = 10
Male -0.11 0.76 0.71 0.41 0.48 -0.01 -0.19 -0.68 -0.83 -2.83
(0.02)*** (0.14)*** (0.13)*** (0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.01) (0.04)*** (0.12)*** (0.15)*** (0.50)***
Atheist -0.03 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.11 n.s. -0.05 -0.16 -0.19 -0.65
(0.04) (0.29) (0.27) (0.15) (0.17) n.s. (0.08) (0.27) (0.32) (1.06)
Education -0.09 0.57 0.54 0.32 0.37 n.s. -0.15 -0.52 -0.63 -2.15
(0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.02)*** (0.03)*** n.s. (0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.04)*** (0.13)***
Size of town -0.005 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 n.s. -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.13
(0.004) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) n.s. (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10)
Retired 0.07 -0.47 -0.45 -0.27 -0.32 n.s. 0.11 0.41 0.51 1.81
(0.04)* (0.26)* (0.24)* (0.15)* (0.18)* n.s. (0.05)** (0.22)* (0.28)* (1.00)*
Self - employed 0.43 2.80 2.28 1.11 0.55 -0.66 -1.33 -3.19 -3.22 -8.71
(0.06)*** (0.35)*** (0.24)*** (0.09)*** (0.13)*** (0.17)*** (0.25)*** (0.48)*** (0.42)*** (0.89)***
Political Orientation -0.06 0.39 0.36 0.21 0.25 n.s. -0.10 -0.35 -0.43 -1.46
(0.01)*** (0.04)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** n.s. (0.01)*** (0.03)*** (0.04)*** (0.13)***
Age
1 0.99 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 n.s. 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.25
(0.39)** (0.03)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.02)** n.s. (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.03)** (0.10)**
Age squared
1 -0.05 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(0.04) n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Stable relationship 0.04 -0.26 -0.25 -0.14 -0.17 n.s. 0.07 0.24 0.29 0.99
(0.02)* (0.15)* (0.14)* (0.08)* (0.09)* n.s. (0.04)* (0.14)* (0.16)* (0.56)*
Pr (y = n) 6.19 7.74 6.33 15.10 7.58 8.12 12.35 8.92 16.49
Significance: *** 99% level; ** 95% level; * 90% level.
n.s. means that the absolute value is almost equal to zero (lesser than 1*10
-3) and the coefficent/marginal effect is not significant
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